Naming the Principles in Democritus: An Epistemological Problem

It is well known that Democritus posited two principles of reality, i. e. atoms and void, and that he gave them many names. Synonyms of atom include the terms “body”, “form” and “thing” or δέν, while void was also called “space”, “infinite” and “no-thing” or μηδέν. What usually escapes the attention of scholars is the problematic outcome that this apparently plain mode of expression raises at the epistemological level. Indeed, according to Proclus (In Plat. Crat. 16 = fr. 68 B 26 DK), Democritus believed that names are not established by nature, but by convention, which may imply that they do not express the true nature of the object named. Proclus gives four proofs on his behalf, among which we find the ἰσορροπία argument. Names do not have a natural link with the objects they refer to and, therefore, do not express their inner essence, since the same thing will receive different designations and meanings, none of which fully expresses its real φύσις. Now, I will argue that, if we apply this idea to the principles, it follows that Democritus may have acknowledged that they are not fully comprehensible to human beings. The fact that both the atom and the void are assigned different names/meanings shows that their nature escapes human understanding. At the same time, I will also briefly suggest that the “ἰσορροπία argument” does not lead to skepticism. Instead, it leads to a rational dogmatism, which recognizes that atoms and void exist, are known and can be expressed through language, although no mind can fully comprehend their essence