David DeGrazia e l’aborto: tra la concezione biologica dell’identità numerica e la teoria degli interessi relativi al tempo

The article reconstructs, analyzes, and defends the position developed by David De- Grazia on the issue of abortion. He elaborates a peculiar approach to the status of the fetus that combines a biological thesis of numerical identity of a materialist nature with McMahan’s theory of time-relative interests. The outcome of this approach is that the fetus, while possessing some value from gastrulation onwards by virtue of its ontological continuity, does not enjoy a significant moral status (in the sense of the right to life) in its early stages of development. This is because, by virtue of the theory of time-relative interests, the absence of a mental life entails an enormous devaluation of its stake in future life. Therefore, even if the pre-sentient fetus has an interest in remaining alive, this time-relative interest is too weak to establish a right to life or a very strong presumption against its killing.